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Abstract—SecDevOps is a paradigm for integrating
the software development and operation processes con-
sidering security and compliance requirements. Orga-
nizations are reluctant to transform their development
and operation processes to SecDevOps because of the
expectation of incompatibility between security and
DevOps. This paper reports about a study performed
at IBM on transformation of five Business Intelligence
(BI) projects to SecDevOps. The study revealed that
main security concerns for the automation of the de-
ployment process are: separation of duties, enforcement
of access controls, manual security tests, audit, security
guidelines, management of security issues, and partici-
pation of the security team. The majors recommended
best practices for a transformation of current processes
to SecDevOps are: good documentation and logging,
strong collaboration and communication, automation
of the process, and enforcement of separation of duties.
Based on the study, we believe that separation of duties
is the main aspect to be considered when planning
to automate deployment processes. The results of the
study are being used by IBM BI Unit and may be used
by other organizations when planning to migrate to
SecDevOps, especially for BI projects.
I. Introduction
DevOps is a practice that aims at integrating software
development and operation processes [1]. It is expected to
reduce deployment cycles, improve the quality of software,
and shorten the time to patch bugs. This helps to increase
the frequency of deployments, which helps to service cus-
tomers faster [2]. Organizations that practice DevOps can
deploy software changes as fast as 500 times per day [3].
CA Technologies found that 1254 out of 1425 surveyed
organizations (i.e., 88%) will adopt DevOps by 2020 [4].
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) providers, such as
IBM Bluemix [5], support the design and operation of
DevOps. Current market solutions focus on micro-service
architectures, which favor independent/decoupled com-
ponents [6], [7]. Established organizations usually have
separate development and operation processes and use
manual processes to transit the software from development
to operations. Adopting DevOps for legacy software is
challenging [8], given the difficulties in managing depen-
dencies and aspects, such as information access policies [9].
IBM is among the companies currently working on
adopting SecDevOps. The company has a set of internal
BI applications to provide insights on their product sales.
These are long-running, frequently changing applications
hosted on legacy systems that need to comply with the
quality and security requirements of the company. IBM is
in the process of automating the development and deploy-
ment processes of the existing BI projects. Automation
of the software deployment process is among the main
DevOps best practices [10]. The organization is interested
to gain insights on the security and compliance aspects
that need to be considered when integrating and automat-
ing the development and operations processes. Rapidly
deployed software changes are more likely to contain vul-
nerabilities if adequate measures are not considered [3].
This paper reports about a case study that we carried
out at IBM to identify the security aspects related to the
automation of the deployment process for BI projects. The
study aims to address the questions:
1) What are the security concerns that impact the
adoption of SecDevOps?
2) What are the best practices for SecDevOps?
This case study focuses on the transformation of devel-
opment and deployment processes into SecDevOps at the
BI Unit of the IBM CIO Europe organization. We selected
five current projects for developing and deploying IBM-
internal BI applications, listed in Table I. We interviewed
nine project stakeholders. The interviews were then tran-
scribed and coded to identify the main themes [11].
There are several empirical studies that aim to study
SecDevOps practices in organizations, e.g., [3], [12]. These
studies report on the generic opinions of project stakehold-
ers. Our study provides a more objective view on the topic;
it reports the opinions of projects stakeholders gained from
working on a set of projects that need to be transformed or
are transformed to the SecDevOps paradigm. The results
of the study are being used by IBM in transforming their
legacy BI projects to SecDevOps. They could be used by
other organizations, as well.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we give an
overview of the development and operation environment
TABLE I
Projects included in the Case Study
NO Project Functionality Environments Manual-
Automated
P1 BMT, Business
Metrics Tool
The project, a part of IBM Sales Analytics, develops and maintains
an information management tool for IBM Technology Support Services.
The information warehouse has information from orders to financing and
customer satisfaction data.
Development,
ITC,
Production
Manual
P2 WWBPDM,World
Wide Business
Partner Data Mart
The project maintains comprehensive information about IBM’s Business
Partners. The data marts provide information from business partner con-
tracts to business partner targets.
Development,
ITC,
Production
Manual
P3 GLIW, Global Lo-
gistics Information
Warehouse
The project maintains IBM’s Global Logistics data to provide analytics
capabilities for smarter and more efficient supply chain.
Development,
ITC,
Production
Manual
P4 PCR Insight A mobile application enabling IBM partner client’s with information on
business partner related activities. The application makes use of data from
the Business Partner Data Mart (BPDM) Europe.
Development Manual
P5 Cognos Reporting The project involves the development of Cognos based reports for end users
utilizing data from the data Warehouses and Datamarts.
Development,
Production
Automated
and process ($$II). Then, we describe the research method
($$III). Next, we discuss the results of the study, namely
the concerns related to automating the deployment pro-
cesses ($$IV), the security impacts of moving to SecDe-
vOps ($$V), and the best practices for SecDevOps ($$VI).
Then, we discuss the threats to validity ($$VII) of the
study. We discuss related work ($$VIII) and conclude the
paper ($$IX) afterwords.
II. Overview of the current Development and
Production Environment and Process
A description of the general architecture of the applica-
tions and development and deployment processes follow.
Fig. 1. Technical architecture used by the projects considered in the
Case Study.
A. High-level Architecture of the Business Intelligence Ap-
plications
Figure 1 visualizes the high-level architecture of the
BI applications considered in this study. The applications
realize the data lake architecture and are hosted on IBM
Z-System servers [13]. In this architecture, several data
source systems are connected to the data warehouse using
interfacing methods. The Extract-Transform-Load pro-
cesses are performed using File Transfer Protocol (FTP);
IBM MQ, a secure and reliable messaging middleware;
IBM DB2, Web services, IBM Lotus Notes; Microsoft
Excel; CATACOMB, and IBM InfoSphere DataStage.
These technologies play a key role in populating the data
lake with cleansed and standardized data. The database
management system for the data warehouses residing on
IBM Z-Systems is IBM’s DB2 for Z/OS and DB2 Ana-
lytics Accelerator. Analytics is supported by IBM Cognos
Analytics; adhoc querying and reporting are done using
IBM DB2 QMF for Workstation. Watson analytics and
IBM SPSS predictive analytics provide statistical analysis
and reporting, predictive modeling, data mining, and big
data analytics. The data in the data warehouse are made
available to external businesses and teams through APIs.
B. Development and Deployment Processes for the Se-
lected Projects
The development of BI applications is iterative. Figure 2
shows the development and deployment processes used by
the five projects. The projects use three execution envi-
ronments: Development, Integration Test Center (ITC),
and Production. Table I specifies the environments used
by each of the projects.
Every application release is assigned a priority based
on the priority of the requirements it handles. Emergency
fixes have the highest priority and are developed and
deployed usually within a day. The deployment of normal
priority releases usually takes at least a week.
The installation package and the release letter, are the
two main deployment artifacts in the projects. The instal-
lation package contains the necessary jobs to install the
release which includes the code for the requirements and
fixes. The release letter specifies the instructions for the
installation of the application in the target environment,
including a list of files included in the installation package
and instructions on file handling. It also describes storage
space requirements in the case of newly developed tables.
Fig. 2. Deployment Process.
The projects follow two deployments processes: manual
deployment process and automated deployment process.
The description of both processes follows.
Manual Deployment Process. Projects P1, P2, P3 and P4
are deployed manually. Figure 2 visualizes the deployment
process of Projects P1, P2 and P3. The process is en-
tirely manual, and involves the exchange of work packages
through FTP and XMIT [14] or email. The communication
takes place mostly over emails and sometimes, through the
IBM internal chat client.
Once application components are developed, developers
perform unit tests (aka lab tests). Sometimes, the Subject
Matter Experts (SMEs) get involved in the lab tests. They
verify the conformance of the given application to its
requirements and report discovered anomalies to the de-
velopers who fix their code accordingly. Once unit tests are
approved, the development team packages all components
necessary for the release and ships the package to the ITC
team.
The ITC team installs the package into the ITC environ-
ment and performs initial installation routine checks. Once
the environment is ready with the installed application,
the SME is notified. The SME performs the tests as an
end-user, and provides a sign-off. The sign-off is directed
to various teams, including the ITC, Production and the
Change Management Teams. The ITC team repackages
the installation artifacts and ships them to the Production
Team when they receive the sign-off from the SME team.
Then, the Production Team proceeds with installing the
application into the production environment when they
receive the change request from the Change Management
Team.
Project P4 is a mobile application that uses a single
server. It uses separated environments for development,
testing and production. The project is developed and
operated by the Development team. The application, on
development, and testing in the development environment,
is directly manually deployed into production by the de-
velopers themselves.
Automated Deployment Process. This deployment process
uses Motio tool [15] to automate the deployment of de-
veloped applications. Project P5 uses this process. Project
P5 deals with report creation using IBM Cognos BI. The
developed reports in the Development environment are
automatically deployed to Production and tested against
production data. An ITC environment exists for this
project, but it is rarely used, since testing on production
data is more effective.
III. Research Method
The goal of the study is to identify the security aspects
that impact the transformation of a manual deployment
process into an automated process. Data collection was
performed at IBM through qualitative semi-structured
interviews with selected stakeholders of the five studied
projects. The description of these steps follow.
A. Definition of the Interview Protocol
The interview protocol was constructed using Turner’s
guidelines [16]. First, a set of interview questions were
formulated based on the research goals and information
from informal discussions with the project leads. The ques-
tionnaire was tested by trial runs with team members for
the selected projects. The questions were revised, based on
the feedback, until interviewees provided answers relevant
TABLE II
List of the interviewees.
Subject.
ID
Role Team Automated
/ Manual
Projects
S1 Chief Architect Overall Both
S2 Program Manager Overall Both
S3 Solution Lead Development Manual
S4 Project Lead Development Automated
S5 Business Analyst/IT
Specialist
Development Manual
S6 IT Specialist Development Manual
S7 Subject Matter
Expert/Information
Warehouse
Administrator
Security Manual
S8 IT Specialist ITC Manual
S9 Mainframe
Operations Analyst
Operations Manual
to the research goal. The open-ended questions enabled
participants to provide detailed responses which helped to
gain more insights.
B. Selection of the Participants
We selected for the interviews nine participants. Table II
lists the selected participants along with their roles and the
teams that they belong to. Project leaders involved in the
overall development and maintenance process of the stud-
ied projects are marked Overall, the developers are marked
Development, the specialists at the integration test cen-
ter responsible for maintaining the test environment are
marked ITC, the production environment maintainers are
marked Operations and the security specialists are marked
Security. The interviewees are selected to openly and
honestly share information to support the research [17].
They cover the different aspects of SecDevOps.
C. Execution of the Interviews
The interviews were a mix of face-to-face and telephonic
interviews. Due to the geographic distribution of the in-
terviewees we conducted three interviews in-person and
six through phone. Each interview lasted about an hour.
The participants were informed about the recording of the
interviews and were briefed about the research goal before
the start of the interview. The interviews were supported
by the questions of the interview protocol as a guideline.
Secondary questions were often used in the interviews to
get further insights. Questions like ’Could you provide an
Example?’ and ’Could you tell me more about...’ helped
gathering comprehensive information.
D. Transcribing Interviews
We transcribed all the interviews and used the tool
oTranscribe1 to help in the process.
E. Interview Coding
We used the thematic analysis method for the interview
coding [11]. Interview Coding uses the interview tran-
scripts as input and outputs codes that identify all the
1otranscribe.com/
TABLE III
The themes identified from interview transcripts.
NO Themes category Themes
1 Security concerns
for the automa-
tion of the de-
ployment process
Separation of duties, enforcement of ac-
cess control policies, manual security
tests, audit, security guidelines, manage-
ment of security issues, participation of
the security team
2 Security impacts
of moving to
SecDevOps
Application security and separation of
duties
3 Best practices
for the
transformation
to SecDevOps
Good documentation and logging, strong
collaboration and communication, au-
tomation of the process, and enforcement
of separation of duties
aspects mentioned during the interviews. A code is a word
or short phrase identifying the essence of a portion of
language-based or visual data. At the end of this step we
assigned codes to each of the nine interview transcripts.
F. Data Extraction and Classification
The next step was to group similar codes together to
form themes. A theme generalizes a set of codes belonging
to a given concept as a theme. The process of assign-
ing themes to codes was done for each transcript. Next,
we gave the transcripts and codes to the interviewees
to ensure that the understanding and interpretation are
correct. Then, we merged the codes that were semantically
similar across transcripts. Table III lists the themes and
associated categories.
G. Analysis of the Results
We classified the codes into three categories: the security
concerns for the automation of the deployment process,
the security impacts of moving to SecDevOps, and the best
practices for the transformation to SecDevOps. We use the
term "process automation" when the aspects that we dis-
cuss are process related and we use the term "SecDevOps"
when the aspects that we discuss could be generalized to
SecDevOps paradigm.
IV. The security concerns for the automation
of the deployment process
This section discusses the findings with respect to the
security state of the projects under the case study. Security
is preserved in the projects mainly through separation of
duties, access control, performing manual security tests,
conducting periodic audits, security guidelines, security is-
sues and their mitigation, and participation of the security
team in the DevOps process.
A. Separation of Duties
Separation of Duties ensures that developers cannot
change code in the production environment. That is, the
teams performing the duties of development, testing and
operations are independent. In the studied applications,
access restrictions are applied using Resource Access Con-
trol Facility (RACF), a security manager providing access
control for z/OS operating systems.
The importance of separation of duties was captured
clearly through an example depicted by a participant who
works on project P4. They said: "we are running on one
server that is used for all the processes – development,
testing and production. Of course it is not good at all. It’s
really dangerous, because if the developer presses the wrong
button, it kills the application that is in production. This is
absolutely not good. We had the problem that the developer
accidentally killed the demo mode. This has happened twice,
and that’s when this became really obvious that we needed
a separated three environments system".
B. Enforcement of Access Control Policies
The main security concept of the Information Ware-
houses (IWs) is to control usage of data by the users using
data views. The users of the data warehouse access the
data through views and do not have direct accesses to the
tables. Security tables maintain access control information
for every user of the IW. The SMEs have access to the
tables. During table creation, access is granted to certain
RACF user groups [18]. If a user belongs to one of the
permitted RACF groups, then, the user is allowed to access
the data via the user views. The user IDs and RACF
groups are created following the general deployment pro-
cess, similar to other requirements.
C. Manual Security Tests
The requirements related to access management are
identified and documented in the requirements specifica-
tion during the requirements analysis process. The security
objects need to be tested before shipment into the Pro-
duction environment once the security requirements are
developed and deployed on the ITC environment. Two of
the participants mentioned that only positive testing for
the security objects (e.g., a user ID is granted access to a
view) is carried out. One participant mentioned that such
security testing is sometimes forgotten. Two participants
mentioned the extensive logging of user accesses to the
warehouse data for security purposes. One participant also
reported that there is a yearly re-validation of user IDs to
ensure that all the current users of the applications have
valid justifications.
D. Audit
The IW projects undergo Application Systems Control
and Auditability (ASCA) – the IBM internal audit –
approximately every six months. The audit intends to
ensure that the systems are robust and reliable. The IW
projects integrated the guidelines necessary for a successful
ASCA audit into their standard processes. The ASCA
auditors review the software against different review el-
ements and grant certifications for software that comply
with all the elements. The certification aims to ensure the
integrity of the data and the accuracy of data processing.
In addition, it helps preventing and detecting frauds. The
elements reviewed during the ASCA audit include: access
management and security evaluation, separation of duties
evaluation, application system management controls, data
security and privacy, and testing. During the ASCA audit,
the security of the IW is reviewed, where a presence of
every single user of the IWs needs to be justified. Inactive
users are to be removed.
E. Security Guidelines
The security guidelines detail the procedure to grant
accesses to new IW users. The new user submits their
access request via the One Team access management tool,
an IBM internal tool used for access request management.
Once the access request is submitted, it follows a two-
step approval process, so the user may be granted access
if entitled to. This two-level approval ensures that only the
relevant users get access to the requested data.
F. Security Issues and Mitigation
All the participants reported that there were no major
security issues with their development and deployment
processes. Two participants illustrated two security issues
that were identified and immediately rectified. One par-
ticipant said "... We had sometimes mild warnings of mild
findings. We had some inactive user IDs that were not
used anymore." They refer to inactive user IDs that were
detected when analyzing the log files. Another participant
reported a security issue related to the user view definition.
They stated: "...if we have a table, that has one million
rows, then, the user view usually should also show you
one million rows. Sometimes there was a problem in the
view definition, and at the end it turned out that the view
returned five million rows." The participant claimed that
such testing of user views is usually forgotten despite its
importance. The mitigation process involves revoking the
access of invalid and unidentified users, or developing a
security fix.
G. Participation of Security Team
The security team consists of two IWs administrators
who are responsible for the security tables setup and the
management of access requests. The security team is in-
volved also in monitoring usage statistics of the data marts
in the project environment and reporting and resolving
abnormal usage activities. In addition, it is involved in
the requirements analysis phase and sometimes involved
in the testing phase of the ITC environment.
H. Discussion
In this study we used four projects that use manual
deployment processes and one project (P5) that uses
automated deployment process–see Table I. Project P5 is
about developing business reports that use existing data.
The BI unit does not consider the project as reference for
SecDevOps because the best practices guidelines at IBM
do not require that projects for reports-based software
to (1) enforce separation of duties, (2) include security
features besides authentication, and (3) undergo audit.
Thus, we do not identify the security concerns and best
practices by comparing project P5 with the other projects.
V. security impacts of moving to SecDevOps
The two major security impacts for moving to SecDe-
vOps, as reported by the participants, are application se-
curity and preservation of separation of duties. We discuss
both impacts in the following.
A. Application Security
Five out of nine participants suggested that the adop-
tion of a DevOps process with automated deployment
and testing would make the system more secure. All 5
participants mentioned that the automated deployment
would result in faster deployments, which in turn would
reduce the duration to deploy security objects and security
fixes. Two participants suggested that automated testing
for access control would make it more robust. One partic-
ipant mentioned that manual testing is limited to positive
testing, and that this could be improved in the presence of
automation. Another participant mentioned that, the test-
ing of user view definitions should be automated because
it is usually forgotten during manual deployments.
B. Separation of Duties
DevOps promotes the close collaboration of the teams
involved in the development and deployment processes.
Five of the participants appealed that separation of duties
should be preserved even in an automated process. The
major suggested requirements to preserve are:
1) The developer should not design the test cases since
the test cases function as gatekeepers for the other
environments.
2) A change request needs to be initiated and approved
by stakeholders before deployment into production.
3) There should be separate access rights for each of
the three environments: Development access, ITC
access and Production access. A developer shall not
have right access to both the Test and Production
environments.
VI. Best Practices for a Transformation to
SecDevOps
The participants suggested a set of best practices to
guide the transformation towards SecDevOps, which we
discuss in the following.
A. Good Documentation and Logging
The automated deployment and testing outcomes need
to be documented for easier detection and elimination
of anomalies in the process and to serve as evidence for
audits. The participants proposed the following practices
for effective documentation:
1) Tools like Rational Team Concert and Rational
Quality Manager can be used for storing the logs
of deployment and testing activities respectively.
2) Security logging of user accesses to data warehouses
are essential and should not be disrupted by the
automation process.
3) Linked meta-data repositories should be created and
maintained to ease retrieval of information relevant
to required components, for example, to retrieve the
last jobs that manipulated a given table.
4) Document repositories should log the details of pro-
cess owners at each step of the deployment process,
for example, to indicate who approved the last tests
set.
5) Documentation should not be shared through a
medium which cannot be traced. For example, data
should not be shared through only the chat clients.
All required information need to be stored in a
central repository that can be accessed by all the
stakeholders of the process.
B. Strong Collaboration and Communication
The participants suggest that collaboration should be
disconnected from the process. For example, the steps of
deployment should be recorded automatically to a repos-
itory accessible to stakeholders on demand. The partici-
pants also recommend that the exchange of unnecessary
emails at each step of the process should be reduced
since this could possibly save a lot of communication
effort. They suggest that the environment owner should
be automatically informed in the case of any issues. They
also propose that the stakeholders should be automatically
notified of successful installations and testing.
C. Automation of Processes
The participants suggest that the automated deploy-
ment process should be as follows. The developers invoke
the task installation to the ITC environment when they
complete the development of their applications. On suc-
cessful completion, the test cases should be run automati-
cally. A change request for installation could be approved
if the results of the tests are conclusive. Then, the package
should be shipped to the production environment, where
it is installed automatically.
The participants suggested improvements to each step
of the existing deployment process to ensure effective
automation. First, the dependencies of the functionalities
that will need to be deployed need to be identified dur-
ing the requirement specification step. This is critical to
prepare for a safe deployment of the software.
Second, the deployment package should contain the
developed artifacts and all required information for the
deployment. For example, the developers need to provide
calculations for storage space requirements of the table
along with table definitions. In addition, the installation
packages sent to the production environment need to
include a fallback plan to ensure recovery in case of any
irregularities during installation. The installation proce-
dures should also define the necessary jobs and batch
processes and their scheduling.
Third, the participants claim that the user tests cannot
be completely automated. They suggest that the auto-
mated process should support two options: automatic
invocation of automated tests after successful installation,
and notification to the tester that the environment is
ready for the manual tests. They also suggest that se-
curity tests should ensure that user views retrieved the
expected results. In addition, they suggest that installation
tests should ensure that the deployed package would not
disrupt the existing system or other associated systems.
The installation tests should ensure that all the packages
that were sent as a part of the deployment package are
received and installed successfully. Post-installation tests
need to verify that the version of package in the current
environment is the same as the expected.
Fourth, service monitoring should be used in the de-
ployment process. It would allow to analyze and report
the health of the services being used by the environment,
which would ease the debugging process in case any issues
in the applications. For example, the feature would enable
detecting whether a given problem is caused by application
code or associated services.
D. Enforcement of Separation of Duties
The participants suggested three separation of duties
practices. First, test cases should be designed by a team
independent of the developers, since the test cases act as
gatekeepers to the other environments. Second, A manual
kick-off before installation to production is required as
every change to the production environment needs to be
driven by a change request. Third, three different sets of
access rights should be defined for the developers, testers
and users accessing the production environment. This
would ensure that people with development access cannot
access the production data.
In addition, the participants propose that the developers
should define installation procedures along with develop-
ing the packages for installation; the ITC team should be
involved in defining automated quality steps or gates that
need to be successful before the automatic installation of
the release happens to the new environment; the SMEs
responsible for testing should design automated test cases;
and the operations team would be required to fix issues
when they arise during installation of the applications to
the production environment.
VII. Threats to validity
We discuss now the limitations of the study according
to Wohlin’s et al. validity taxonomy [19], [20].
Construct validity. To ensure valid relation between the
performed study and the goal of the study, we first per-
formed a literature review. Next, we designed interview
protocol and tested it with three experts. In each iteration,
the questions and the answers were discussed with peers
and the questions were adjusted to be more clear and
efficient in getting the required information. In addition,
we collected the information from nine interviewees who
have different roles and are located in different cities.
Moreover, the interviewees worked on five projects, which
gives confidence in the stability of the collected data. The
main limitation of the study is that we only collected the
data by interviewing domain experts and we did not cross-
validate the results with other source of information.
Internal validity. To ensure causal relationship between
the study and its results we told the interviewees at
the opening of the interviews the goal of the study. We
have participants from five projects covering development,
operation, testing, and security aspects. Nevertheless, we
do not claim saturation.
Conclusion validity. To ensure ability to draw correct
conclusions from the results of the study, we sent each
interviewee a short report about the codes that we ex-
tracted from the interview that we conducted with them
to ensure that we have a common understanding; that is,
we performed member checking [21]. In addition, the main
author checked the extracted codes and identified themes
with the two other researchers to reduce the subjectivity
of the results. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the
perspective of the researchers may have impacted the data
extraction and interpretation.
External validity. The study was conducted for one ap-
plication domain, namely BI, at one company, namely
IBM Europe. We observe that several of the identified
aspects are strongly related to the application domain or
application size, such as the control of access to data using
the view, or strongly related to IBM such as the use of
ASCA audit. The results of the study could be used for
transformation of BI projects to SecDevOps, especially
within IBM, without high risk.
VIII. Related work
Farroha et al. [2] describe the need for DevOps. They
note, however, that fast deployments usually compromise
the security and compliance of software. They propose a
framework to incorporate and maintain security in systems
providing continually updated services. Storms [22] shared
the position of the importance of security in DevOps. He
advocated that security could be preserved in a DevOps
environment, if the right processes and techniques are in
place. Vries [23] also promotes the importance of setting
security goals during requirements engineering. In addi-
tion, they describe in [23] how security processes, like
security tests and security scans can make use of DevOps.
Schneider [12], introduced the Secure DevOps Maturity
Model (SDOMM) which guides applications to attain the
target security levels through integrating open source tools
in the continuous integration process.
Mohan et al. [9] surveyed the literature from academia
and industry to identify the main aspects of SecDevOps.
The main aspects that they found are: definition, security
best practices, compliance, process automation, tools for
SecDevOps, software configuration, team collaboration,
availability of activity data and data secrecy.
Rahman and Williams [3] analyzed a selected set of
Internet artifacts and surveyed representatives of nine or-
ganizations that are using DevOps. They observed that the
majority of the practitioners have expressed the potential
of common DevOps activities to improve the security of
a system. In addition, they observed that organizations
that integrate security into DevOps support collaboration
between the security team and the development and op-
erations teams.
We note that according to Raynaud [24], applying De-
vOps principles to security is easy. In addition, it helps im-
prove the relationship between security and development
teams and ultimately the success of a product. Balalaie et
al. [6] reported on their experiences and lessons learned
from adopting DevOps and how this facilitated a smooth
migration of security issues.
IX. Conclusion
Automation of deployment process is critical to the
transformation of development and operation processes
to SecDevOps. This paper reports about the security
aspects related to automating the deployment process.
The interviewees reported seven concerns to be considered
when planning to automate a deployment process. Two of
the concerns, management of access control policies and
audit, are related to BI domain, which is the application
domain of this study. The other five concerns are generic
and could apply to contexts other than BI projects at IBM.
The study identified four best practices for a transfor-
mation to SecDevOps: documentation and logging, strong
collaboration and communication, automation of the de-
ployment process, and enforcement of separation of duties.
We find that these recommendations are common sense.
We observe that separation of duties was mentioned in
the three aspects of the study: the security concerns for
the automation of the deployment process, the security
impacts of moving to SecDevOps, and the best practices
for the transformation to SecDevOps. We believe that sep-
aration of duties is the main aspects to be considered when
planning a transformation of development and operation
processes to SecDevOps.
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